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Abstract 
This paper assesses UK innovation policy impact on a large, population weighted, 
sample of both service and manufacturing SMEs. By focussing on self-reported 
innovation the study achieves a wider coverage of the effects of SME innovation policy 
than possible with more traditional indicators. Propensity score matching indicates that 
SMEs receiving UK state support for innovation were more likely to innovate than 
unsupported comparable enterprises. Innovating enterprises are shown to have grown 
significantly faster over the years 2002-4 when other growth influences are 
appropriately controlled. Combining these two results and comparing the outlays on 
SME innovation policy with the estimated effects suggests that policy was efficient as 
well as effective. There is evidence that SME tax credits were expensive compared with 
earlier support instruments. But the overall high returns estimated suggest that, even in 
times of public spending cuts, persisting with SME innovation policy would be prudent. 
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Effectiveness and Efficiency of SME Innovation Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovation policy aims to promote the commercial exploitation of new ideas as 
products, processes, and organisational techniques (OECD 2003). The policy is 
increasingly prominent in EU and OECD countries because ‘market failure’ is judged to 
matter in this field.  EU Member States are permitted to provide state aid to firms as 
long as it  
‘addresses a defined market failure, and the identified benefits outweigh the distortions 
to competition resulting from the aid’. (European Commission 2006). 
 
Market failures are particularly liable to arise in the generation and utilisation of 
knowledge; one example occurs when those who do not invest in research and 
development (R&D) nonetheless gain knowledge from others’ investments. As a 
consequence of such market failures, social returns to R&D are estimated to be high and 
to exceed private returns by a wide margin (Griffith et al 2001; HM Treasury et al 2004; 
Wieser 2005).   
 
Typically innovation policy evaluation has focused on the R&D input, rather than on the 
innovations themselves, and restricted the analysis to large manufacturing firms (Jones 
and Williams 1998, Hall and Van Reenen 1999)- although more recently coverage has 
been extended to manufacturing SMEs (e.g. Hall et al 2009). Service as well as 
manufacturing firms employing fewer than 250 persons accounted for about one half of 
private sector jobs and turnover in the United Kingdom during 2007 (BERR 2008 Table 
1); all types of SMEs  matter for the economy. For these enterprises there is evidence 
that R&D surveys markedly under-report research activity and innovativeness 
(Kleinknecht 1987; Harris 2009)1. Lev (2001) noted that many innovative firms did not 
include any R&D expenditure figures in their reports. Instead of formal R&D, investment 
                                                 
1
 Kleinknecht’s study showed  that according to the official R & D survey, 91% of private R & D in Dutch manufacturing firms was 
undertaken by large firms (with 500 and more employees). According to Kleinknecht’s  estimate, this percentage would fall to 82.4% 
(when considering only firms with 50 and more employees) , and declines even more to 77.3% when adding the R & D of firms with 
10 to 49 employees  not covered in the official survey. 
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in plant and equipment is more strongly associated with innovation by smaller 
businesses (Smith 2005; Skuras et al 2008)2.  The approach adopted here to evaluating 
policy therefore is to consider the impact on self-reported innovation on both 
manufacturing and services SMEs, and how this innovation affects the economy. 
 
The central question is whether ‘reporting unit’ level data in the Fourth Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS4) (DTI 2006) shows that British SME innovation policy in 2002-4 
was effective and efficient3. An effective policy is simply one that gets results – achieves 
‘additionality’- but the costs of doing so might exceed the benefits4. The resources 
deployed with an efficient policy yield social returns greater than their alternative uses. 
 
In their recent survey Ientile and Mairesse (2009) concluded that an innovation policy 
was effective; business R&D investment grew in response to a tax credit in all the cases 
reviewed. Their observation that a unit of taxpayer’s money sometimes generated less 
than a unit of additional R&D does not necessarily indicate the policy was inefficient. 
The evaluation of this so-called ‘bang for the buck’ (Baghana and Mohnen 2009) need 
not even approximate an assessment of social efficiency, for it fails to take into account 
the social returns to the induced R&D. If returns to unsubsidised R&D at the margin are 
high (as for instance the survey of Wieser 2005 finds), then they may still be high (albeit 
reduced) on the tax credit that induced less than one for one R&D outlays. Links 
between policy spending and ultimate social returns must be established to evaluate 
policy efficiency, a contribution of the present paper. A second contribution is to 
distinguish between the impacts of traditional state support for SME innovation and of 
R&D tax credits. Studies such as Czarnitzki et al (2011) that estimate the impact of tax 
credits typically do not compare them with alternative innovation policies. 
                                                 
2 If this point is accepted then the Crepon et al (1998) model using R&D as an intermediate variable, standard for larger firms, is not 
appropriate for SMEs. 
3 The   UK CIS5 cannot be used for this purpose because the public policy questions were dropped. 
4 Following HM Treasury (2003 p52) for the definition. “The success of government intervention in terms of increasing output or 
employment in a given target area is usually assessed in terms of its ‘additionality’. This is its net, rather than its gross, impact after 
making allowances for what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.” 
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Section 2 outlines UK state aid for innovation in an international context. Then section 3 
discusses the method and the data. A key methodological problem is how to establish 
what supported firms would have done if they had not received state aid for innovation 
and conversely, whether or not unsupported enterprises would have innovated had 
they been helped. A propensity score matching solution is outlined. No less essential to 
policy evaluation is estimation of the impact of innovations. The section therefore 
considers how the growth of the firm responds to them, the measurement of the 
ultimate policy output and control function and instrumental variables estimation.  The 
final subsection of 3 discusses the CIS4 data from which these equations are estimated. 
In section 4 the results are reported and in the following section (5) the estimated 
parameters are employed to calculate a downward biased or conservative estimate of 
the overall impact and efficiency of SME innovation policy. 
 
2 . Context of UK Innovation Policy  
Official concern about possible uncorrected market failure in British innovation focused 
on Business R&D intensity, which was persistently lower in the UK than in the US, France 
or Germany over the decade after 1992 (DTI 2003 Table  1.1). Firms in the UK were also 
less likely to be innovative, according to analysis of the aggregated Community 
Innovation Survey 3. Moreover the proportion of innovators in manufacturing sectors 
that received public financial support for innovation was significantly lower in the UK 
than in France, Germany and Spain (Abramovsky et al 2004).  
 
Most of the R&D discrepancy was attributable to lower British spending in a few 
manufacturing industries. In the UK service sector greater R&D intensity narrowed the 
gap, suggesting that an exclusive focus on manufacturing industry typical of most 
studies could be misleading. 42 percent of R&D performed in the UK was funded by UK 
businesses in 2005, a smaller proportion than other G7 countries and the OECD average.  
Perhaps because of a low British propensity to invest in innovation, the UK had a 
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relatively high share of R&D funded from abroad, at around 19 percent in 2005 (DIUS 
Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2008). 
 
That muted UK state support may be a reason for lower innovation rates was suggested 
by another aggregative cross-Europe CIS3 analysis. State aid was a statistically significant 
contributor to the fraction of innovative firms and to the proportion of innovative 
products in turnover (Jaumotte and Pain 2005b). For the UK, unlike  France, Germany 
and Spain, Griffith et al (2006 Table 3) using disaggregated CIS3 found  that for all sizes 
of firms state  funding had no effect on R&D intensity.  
On the other hand the problem may lie in the measurement. Certainly a caveat is that 
international comparisons of state aid for innovation can be problematic. The EC 
Competition Directorate estimates UK spending to be low and falling (Table 1). Yet 
British figures for R&D tax credits alone exceed the Directorate’s estimates for 2005-7 
(Table 2). The reason is that whereas the SME tax credit counts as state aid, the large 
firm tax credit support does not.5  
 
Table 1 State Aid for Research & Development & Innovation (million €, average p.a.) 
  
 2002-2004 2005-2007   
Germany 1661 1836   
France 1249 1721   
Italy 759 731   
United Kingdom 771 543   
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/ws3_21.xls 
 
Table 2 Cost of Support UK R&D tax credit (£ mill) (accruals basis)   
 Average 2002/3- 2004/5  2005/6     2006/7 
All R&D schemes  507  630 670 
SME scheme 197  180 200 
Source: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/rd-accrualsbasis.pdf 
 
To support innovation, traditionally the UK government employed grant-based schemes, 
such as the Small Firm Merit Awards for Research and Technology (SMART) and Support 
for Products Under Research (SPUR). But in 2000, they introduced as well an R&D tax 
                                                 
5 Communication from Competition DG, European Commission, 20 May 2009. 
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credit for SMEs, extending the scheme in 2002 to include large companies. SMEs did not 
need to make profits to benefit from the credit; if they incurred losses SMEs could claim 
a cash payment from the tax authority equal to 24 percent of their eligible R&D 
spending (Abramovsky et al 2004). 
 
3.  Method and Data 
3.1 The Innovating SME 
Estimates of innovation policy impact require both measures of innovation output or 
outcome, and a model of the innovating firm. Possible innovation measures include 
patents, with three major approaches (Griliches 1990). But patent applications are only 
one of many means of innovation protection. Patents are rarely used in services and by 
small firms so that this indicator will understate innovation in these sectors (Jaumotte 
and Pain 2005a 25). Another method has been to identify and count ‘significant’ 
innovations (Tether et al 1997). A drawback is that there is no obvious way of comparing 
the relative importance of the innovations and therefore count measures of innovation 
output may be misleading. A number of recent studies suggest instead that the self-
reported approach can explain company performance (North and Smallbone 2000: Freel 
2000: Roper et al 2008; Skuras et al 2008; Hall et al 2009).  
 
This self-reported approach, as employed by the CIS4 questionnaire to management, is 
probably currently the best available SME innovation measure for the UK. Innovations 
are here defined as products or processes that were at a minimum, new (or significantly 
improved) to the enterprise. The CIS definition of innovations does not require them to 
be profitable or accepted by the market6; quality enhancement or cost reduction could 
come at the expense of each other, change can be damaging. In principle then it is 
                                                 
6‘ Innovation is defined as major changes aimed at enhancing your competitive position, your performance, your know-how or your 
capabilities for future enhancements. These can be new or significantly improved goods, services or processes for making or 
providing them.’ Innovation here is measured as either or both of process or product innovation, either new to the firm or to the 
market. 
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possible that innovations, as measured, impact adversely or not at all on business 
performance. 
 
How SMEs innovate will depend on how they acquire and utilise knowledge, how they 
invest in innovation and the challenges posed by this type of investment, in contrast to 
others (Hall 2009). Such investment creates an intangible asset, the firm’s knowledge 
base, from which innovations and profits may be generated. Much of this ‘knowledge 
capital’ is implicit rather than formal, dependent upon the firm’s employees. So, human 
capital of graduates should be an important, measurable, contributor to this base. SMEs 
may be especially likely to abstain from intramural R&D on grounds of excessive risk and 
limited access to finance compared with larger firms (Rammer et al 2009). 
 
Effective public support intended to counteract market failures, the central concern of 
the present study, will further add to an enterprise’s resource base and so stimulate 
innovation. The in-part tacit nature of knowledge implies that personal contacts, 
imitation and frequent interactions for SMEs are particularly necessary for knowledge 
transmission. Collaboration with other firms and institutions will therefore matter 
(Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, 2005; Roper et al. 2008); around 13 percent of UK firms 
in the CIS4 engaged in such arrangements (DTI 2006 25-6). In short, the ‘innovative SME’ 
model proposed here controls for the direct influence of collaboration arrangements on 
an enterprise’s chances of innovating.   
 
Another control in the model recognizes that enterprise resources for utilizing 
knowledge will include human capital. Non-human resources devoted to knowledge 
production, utilization and innovation comprise R&D spending and investment in plant 
and machinery. New firms may be more likely than other businesses to have been 
established to exploit an innovation, so that age or date of formation could be an 
influence upon the chances of innovating. Larger enterprises are usually able to draw 
upon more indivisible knowledge or other resources than smaller, in which case firm 
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size will positively influence innovation, though the relationship may be more subtle 
than the Schumpeter hypothesis about the greater innovativeness of larger firms (Acs 
and Audretsch 1988; Tether et al 1997; Hall et al 2009).  Membership of an enterprise 
group could exercise a similar effect. Technological opportunities for innovation are 
likely to vary between industries. Consequently sector controls are included in the 
model. 
 
The estimated innovation equation assumes that I i* is an unobserved, or latent, 
variable, the chances of enterprise i innovating. An innovation is achieved (I = 1)) if I*≥0 
and not achieved (I=0) if I*<0. Both of these outcomes can be observed.  So, where u i is 
a disturbance term ; 
 
Probability of innovation  [Ii=1] = Pr[I i*≥0] = X1’b + ui1  
     = f(state support, collaborative arrangements for innovation, firm size, human capital,       
        R&D, investment, firm age, sector, enterprise group member, ui1)              …(1) 
where f is a cumulative distribution function. 
 
There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence consistent with innovation causing or 
permitting exporting (BIS 2010 11-12) which would be a reason for excluding foreign 
sales from the controls in the innovation equation (1). But the association of these 
variables also may include an element of innovation being driven by exporting (BIS, 2010 
54-62). For this reason it could be desirable to include exporting as a control in the 
innovation equation in case the policy coefficient is altered by its presence.  
 
3.2 Allocation of State Aid for Innovation 
Whether traditional state aid for innovation is given to an SME depends upon 
management making an application and upon civil servants judging the application 
appropriate for the terms of the support. The allocation of aid is determined by the 
interaction of these two groups; even if state officials could ‘pick winners’ they cannot 
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force state aid upon an enterprise. Even if an enterprise knows they have a good idea 
they cannot insist that civil servants allocate state aid to innovate it. When successful 
applicants exclude a high proportion of firms poor at innovating and consist of those 
likely anyway to innovate, there would be much less policy ‘additionality’ than at first 
sight appears. The disturbance term in the innovation equation (ui1) would be correlated 
with the State aid allocation. Aid would be non-randomly assigned to SMEs. Unobserved 
particularly innovative managements may for lack of time perhaps have a lower 
propensity to seek and obtain state support for innovation, generating a negative 
association between ui1 and the independent variable of interest. 
 
What determines an enterprise’s willingness to apply for innovation aid and the 
inclination of the authorities to grant it? If the likely success of the aid is a determinant 
then everything that influences the probability of innovation might be included in the 
aid allocation equation. In addition, policy has a strong regional element in the UK and 
therefore the location of the enterprise also influences the chances of receiving state 
aid. The State aid equation assumes that the latent variable S*i is the perceived net 
benefit- by the applicant and in conformity with programme conditions -  of support for 
firm i , X2 are the explanatory variables and ui2 is a disturbance term. S = 0 if S*i<0. S = 1 
if S*i ≥0. 
 
Probability state support [Si=1] = Pr[S i*≥0] = X2’b + ui2 = 
                g(location, sector, foreign sales, collaborative arrangements, enterprise size, 
age, human capital, R*D, ui2)                                       ...(2) 
where g is a cumulative distribution function. 
 
Possibly the process differs between the R&D tax credit and other support schemes 
because the receipt of the tax credit is more exclusively dependent upon enterprise 
management and less on officials. In which case, aid equation (2) should yield different 
parameters for the two types of state support. 
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Equation 2 can control for non-random allocation of innovation support to firms in a 
propensity score matching exercise (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman et al 1997: 
Oh et al. 2009). If enterprises were entirely randomly assigned to the two groups, state 
aided establishments and others, the difference in mean innovation outcome could be 
attributed to the state aid. Each firm getting state aid is therefore matched where 
possible with a business with an identical probability (propensity score) from equation 2 
that did not receive aid7. All firms that can be matched are ‘on support’. The difference 
in the mean innovation chances of these two groups is then attributed to the aid.   
 
Matching analyses are based on two key principles:  the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) and common support. The first principle requires that any 
unobservable variation in innovation chances, after adjusting for the effects of whatever 
variables determine the allocation of support, has the same random distribution for 
aided and non-aided firms. Common support, the second principle, necessitates that 
comparable observations are available for both groups; if size is a determinant of state 
aid, some big and some small firms must receive aid while some of both categories must 
not8. 
 
A test of how well the matching is undertaken is to compare the means of the 
characteristics determining the propensity score before and after matching. Firms with 
graduates in their workforces are more likely to innovate than others. Hence before 
matching firms receiving innovation support more probably employ graduates than 
unaided establishments. But after matching the chances of employing graduates should 
                                                 
7 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that matching enterprises on just the propensity score, rather than matching firms on the 
vector of characteristics of equation 2, was appropriate. This is because firms receiving state aid but with the same value of the 
propensity score as those not receiving it have the same distribution as the entire vector of regressors. 
8 Matching estimators do not rely on linear extrapolation (outside the common support region) or functional form assumptions. Nor 
do they require an exclusion variable or impose joint normality assumptions. 
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be similar between state aided and control groups – even though the matching is on the 
score and not on the determinants of the score9. 
 
3.3. Innovation and SME Growth. 
Commonly models of the impact of innovation and knowledge seek to explain labour 
productivity (for example Belderbos 2004, Roper et al 2008). Alternatively they employ 
a Cobb-Douglas production function to predict output (for instance Harris et al 2009). 
Crepon et al (1998) use as dependent variable value added per employee, while van 
Leuween and Klomp (2006) and Hall et al (2009) favour turnover per employee. The 
present exercise instead adopts proportionate increase in turnover as the measure of 
innovation impact. As shown below, rise in turnover provides the closest approximation 
to the increase in welfare from innovation and it is also readily measurable with CIS4.  
 
Successful innovation either lowers an SME’s costs or expands their demand or both. If a 
firm faces a perfectly price inelastic demand then the proportionate cut in price from a 
successful process innovation would match the proportionate increase in welfare. 
Productivity increase would be a good proxy for the impact of the innovation. But profit 
maximisation requires that firms operate in the output range where they face a price 
elastic demand. Consequently a cost and price reduction expands sales and turnover, 
and productivity increase understates the value of the innovation. How much expansion 
takes place depends upon the price elasticity of demand.  
 
An impact assessment based solely on labour productivity and a production function is 
especially mis-specified when a product innovation shifts the enterprise’s demand 
function. Profit maximisation normally ensures that sales volume of the now improved 
products expands but, with a constant elasticity of demand and constant returns to 
scale, the price remains unchanged.  Turnover and output (or value added) increase, but 
                                                 
9
 Combining the propensity score matching with a difference-in-differences estimator ( Blundell and Costa Dias 2000) might improve 
the efficiency of estimates. Unfortunately Community Innovation Survey 4, the data source for the present exercise, does not 
include the observations on SME innovation in two distinct periods that would permit this approach. 
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measured productivity does not; only welfare or ‘utility’ productivity rise (see Appendix 
A). A conventional productivity index will markedly understate the welfare effect of such 
innovations. 
 
The output increase from innovation is more closely related to the ‘surplus’ measures of 
well-being from welfare economics; consumers’ surplus and profits. The relation varies 
with the average price elasticity of demand faced by the firm in the short run. Tellis’ 
(1988) meta-analysis of several hundred studies concluded that the mean price elasticity 
faced by firms was in the region of -2.5. With constant elasticity demand functions and 
constant returns to scale, in this region the proportionate change in sales revenue is a  
downward biased measure of welfare expansion in relation to initial turnover – but 
considerably less biased downwards than change in productivity (Appendix A).  
 
Turning now to the model in which the impact of innovation on enterprise growth is 
embedded, younger firms may possess a greater capacity for learning about their own 
capabilities, as well as about their markets, boosting their growth rates by this route 
(Pakes and Ericson 1998). Allowing for enterprise age in the enterprise growth equation 
therefore would help distinguish between innovation itself and other sources of growth. 
For the same reason, firms with greater knowledge capital should be better placed to 
grow. Thus human capital and membership of an enterprise group (Sutton 1997) may be 
expected to influence growth independently of size and innovation. For the ith firm 
then; 
 
Growth rate ti =  
f( Innovation, Lagged Output, Age, Human Capital, Enterprise Group Membership,u3i)     …(3) 
 
Unbiassed estimates of the effect of innovation on turnover require that the 
disturbance term, ui3, is uncorrelated with innovation. Unobserved especially innovative 
managements may also be less interested in, or competent at, running a large firm than 
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other management teams; if so there would be a negative association between the 
output disturbance term and the innovation variable.  Measuring output or turnover 
before and after the innovation (in 2002 and 2004 in the present study) and considering 
the difference for innovators and non-innovators goes some way to eliminating this 
problem. Unobserved management of the above type would be a common factor that 
was eliminated by differencing (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). However this ‘difference 
in differences’ approach does not address the case where, say, unobserved innovative 
management are not very interested in, or good at, growth. 
 
A potential solution to such bias in this instance is to instrument innovation to obtain 
the estimate of the impact on output growth. In practice good instruments may not be 
available and invalid or ‘weak’ instruments estimate more biased and inconsistent IV 
coefficients, as well as with larger standard errors, than those of OLS (Staiger and Stock 
1997). Because instrumental variables estimators are less efficient than OLS, whether IV 
estimation is necessary should be first tested. Including the residuals from innovation 
equation (1) in equation (3) is such a test for potential bias in the parameter estimate of 
the impact of innovation on growth. It also provides a control function estimate of the 
parameter (Heckman and Navarro 2004)10. If the residuals’ coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero the hypothesis can be rejected that the disturbance term in the 
growth equation is correlated with the innovation measure11. In these circumstances 
single equation estimates of the impact of innovation on growth are consistent and 
unbiased.  
 
The policy effect then is deduced from the two basic equations (1) and (3). From them 
can be obtained two magnitudes; the effect of support on the chances of innovation, 
                                                 
10 These are generalized or Gourieroux (1987) residuals because (1) is a probit equation. Where y is the dependent variable, the 
residuals are: 
u = [pdf(xB)/cdf(xB)]*[(1 - cdf(xB))*(y - cdf(xB)] 
When y = 1, u = pdf(xB)/cdf(xB), 
when y = 0, u = - pdf(xB)/(1 - cdf(xB)), 
where pdf and cdf are the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of N(0,1).  
11 This a version of  the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test  (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  
.  
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and the impact of innovation on turnover/profits plus consumers’ surplus (on the 
assumptions discussed above). The product of these two parameters gives the average 
impact of policy on those enterprises that received support. Multiplying by the 
proportion of firms that obtained state aid and their contribution to the performance 
measure yields the boost due to policy. Then if we know how much is spent on policy 
this outcome may be interpreted as the return.  
 
3.4. Data and Model Specification  
Data for the present exercise comes from the Fourth Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS4) and the variables are summarised in Table 3. This source is essentially a cross-
section average for the period 2002-4, but with both beginning and end period 
observations for turnover and employment, so the results must be interpreted with this 
in mind. CIS4 in the UK obtained valid responses from 16,446 enterprises, yielding a 
response rate of 58 percent (DTI 2006). CIS data is collected at the reporting unit (i.e. 
establishment) level, not at the firm/enterprise or plant/local unit level12.  
 
Sampling weights for CIS4 were created by using the inverse sampling proportion in 
each stratum13. These weights may correct for bias introduced by different response 
rates across enterprise size, sector or region, in particular compensating for under-
sampling of small businesses. Formally CIS4 includes enterprises as small as ten 
employees, although in the unweighted data set of the present analysis, ten percent 
employ ten or fewer.  
                                                 
12 The CIS survey questionnaire refers to enterprise, but defines this as a reporting unit. ‘An enterprise is defined as the smallest 
combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain autonomy in 
decision making, especially for the allocation of its current resources. An enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more 
location.’ So the reporting unit may be a subsidiary of a larger firm, or it may be a single plant or even several plants in the same or 
different regions. Some enterprises operating in one region may be owned by enterprises located in another region and so classified 
to this other region. The smaller the unit size the more likely it is to be a single plant firm operating at a single location. The 
theoretically ideal unit is one with substantial operational autonomy at the location where it is recorded. In practice the unit could 
affect places where it controls other units without substantial autonomy. For empirical purposes much depends upon how ‘a certain 
autonomy’ is interpreted in the data.      
13 The weight assigned to each enterprise was the number in the population divided by the number of responses in that stratum. On 
average each respondent represents 11 enterprises in the population. In our smaller sample there is a maximum of 13367 
enterprises, the median weight is 7.4 and the mean 10.4. The largest percentile has a weight of 45.7 and the smallest 1.43.  
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In the empirical specification of (1) human capital is measured by whether or not the 
enterprise employs graduates14. Collaboration options are those with other group 
enterprises, with customers, with suppliers, with competitors and with universities. Firm 
size is measured as the log of turnover in 2002. Enterprise ‘age’ is whether the firm was 
established after 1 January 2000. Intramural R&D spending is normalised by turnover 
and so is plant and machinery investment. Binary UK state policy variables distinguish 
R&D tax credit claimed, local/regional state support for innovation, and 
national/devolved state support. EU policy variables are first, whether support was 
received and second if so, whether the enterprise participated in 5th or 6th Framework. 
14 industrial sectors are distinguished and 12 regions. 
Table 3 CIS4 Descriptive Statistics (Weighted) 
 Firm Size 
 Large SME 
UK state innovation aid 0.1039 0.0950 
State aid exc tax credit 0.1039 0.0950 
Tax credit claimed 0.0526 0.0421 
EU aid 0.0232 0.0134 
EU framework programme 0.0149 0.0084 
Innovation 0.5272 0.3638 
Collaboration       –other group 0.1624 0.0669 
suppliers 0.1859 0.1046 
customers 0.1842 0.1008 
competitors 0.1101 0.0582 
university 0.0982 0.0454 
Human capital: graduates employed 0.7671 0.5564 
Percent graduates 16.296 16.912 
Size: ln. turnover 2002 10.466 7.2644 
Age: start after 1.1. 2000 0.0819 0.1398 
Intramural R&D/Turnover 0.0156 0.0546 
Plant and machinery 
investment/turnover 0.0367 0.0621 
Turnover growth 2002-4 0.1792 0.1410 
Employment growth 2002-4 0.0984 0.0543 
Enterprise group member 0.6768 0.2622 
Foreign sales 0.4881 0.3058 
   
                                                 
14 The proportions of science and engineering graduates employed in the labour force and the proportion of other graduates did not 
prove significant explanatory variables. 
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Notes: Units with zero turnover are excluded. Variables are binary 
unless specified as ratios, logarithms, percentages or growth rates. SEs 
in italics. Large firms employ 250 or more,  
 
 
Just under one in ten SMEs received some form of state innovation aid (Table 3). R&D 
tax credits were more of a minority interest, with slightly less than one half of firms that 
received state aid also claiming the credits. More than half of large businesses stated 
that they innovated in the period 2002-4, compared with little more than one third of 
SMEs.  
 
SMEs more probably started recently and recorded the higher mean ratios of intramural 
R&D to turnover and investment. Smaller establishments were less likely to utilise 
graduates but those that did employed sufficient to ensure that the average proportion 
of graduate workers, at just under 17 percent, did not vary much between the two size 
categories. All forms of extra-firm collaboration for innovation were more common with  
large enterprises.  
 
A comparison of mean turnover and employment growth across enterprise size 
indicates that, although on average SMEs’ turnover rose more slowly, labour 
productivity grew faster. Large establishments were likely to be members of an 
enterprise group whereas small establishments were not (three out of four were not). 
Consistent with their greater probability of a more recent start, small firms were 
unlikely to export (not much more than a one in four chance) while almost half of large 
establishments did so.  
 
The foregoing data provide the variables for isolating the impact of receipt of state aid 
on innovation and, indirectly, on growth. For each enterprise there are two equations of 
fundamental interest, determining the likelihoods of innovation and growth, and one 
equation, determining the chances of state support that may be necessary to ensure 
such support can be treated as exogenous to innovation. 
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4. Results 
4.1 State Aid and Innovation 
The first relationship, how state aid affects innovation by SMEs, is estimated by nearest 
neighbour propensity score matching (Leuven and Sianesi 2003; Oh et al 2009).  For 
matching based upon weighted equations, standard errors of estimates have not been 
defined in the literature. The Propensity Score programme PSMatch2 authors (Leuven 
and Sianesi 2003) recommend looking at the balance of weighted and unweighted 
estimates and choosing the best balance. In addition to doing this, a pseudo-sample is 
created by grossing up the data with the sample weights, and the matching exercise is 
conducted on this much larger data set. 
 
In practice there is little difference between results from weighted and unweighted data 
(Appendix B) and the standard errors for the unweighted and grossed up data are very 
small relative to the coefficients. Collaboration with Universities is one of the most 
important positive correlates of the likelihood of receiving state aid for innovation. 
Exporters, employers of graduates and spenders on R&D are also more likely to have 
innovation aid. Wales is the region where enterprises are most likely to get aid, and 
London the least likely. 
 
All firms receiving aid have a counterpart in the non-aided firm population. For instance 
in (the typical) estimated equation (iii) of Table 4, among those not receiving innovation 
aid the predicted probability of receiving it (not tabulated) ranges from effectively zero 
to one  with a mean of 0.102 and a median of 0.072. Among those granted innovation 
aid the predicted probability ranges from 0.01 to 1 with a mean of 0.25 and a median of 
0.19. Thus the zone in which there is no ‘common support’ given by those not receiving 
aid is extremely small.  
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Nearest neighbour matching takes each of the SMEs receiving innovation aid and 
identifies the firm not accepting aid with the most similar propensity score. To ensure 
the quality of the matches a tolerance for comparing propensity scores is imposed.  In 
table 4 in all but one instance (eq. iv) a 0.001 calliper is set; where the propensity score 
of an aid-receiving firm falls beyond this bound for a near comparator, the firm remains 
unmatched and is dropped from the sample.  There is a trade-off between more precise 
matching and a smaller sample.  
 
 
Table 4: State Aid for Innovation: Propensity Score Matching for SMEs 
 weighted data weighted  probit unweighted probit 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
UK innovation policy effect 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.3 0.27 
Standard  error 0.006    0.02 0.02 
Absolute % bias before matching 14.12 14.51 18.62 18.62 14.51 18.61 
Absolute % bias after matching 4.17 3.23 2.49 3.34 2.37 2.78 
State aided off support 838 64 144  59 141 
Total state aided 11591 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 
Total sample 121995 10093 10093 10093 10093 10093 
Specification Restricted restricted Full Full restricted Full 
.001 caliper no replacement Yes yes Yes No yes Yes 
Note: standard errors cannot be calculated for weighted probits. Nearest neighbour matching. 
 
Since the present sample is quite large, the calliper approach is generally preferred. In 
equation (iv), without the calliper, although the mean gap between the probability score 
and that of the nearest neighbour is only .0006, or .06 percent, the 99th percentile gap is 
.012 or 1.2 percent. The cost of using the calliper is seen in the fifth row of Table 4, 
‘State aided, off support’. For equation (iii), 144 out of 1142 cases receiving aid must be 
dropped. The matching is generally good. For equation (iii) Table 4 for instance, after 
matching no variables are significantly different between the aid recipients and no aid 
recipients at the one percent level and only two variables out of 36 are significantly 
different at the five percent level (Appendix C)15.  
                                                 
15
 In Appendix C the value of ‘foreign sales’ of aid recipients after matching is 0.527 and for the control 
group it is 0.573. This difference is significant at the 3.9 percent level. However dropping the foreign sales 
variable from the state innovation support equation reduces the equation fit, leads to a significant difference at 
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All the coefficients from the exercises reported in Table 4 are very similar. On the basis 
of lowest absolute percentage bias after matching, an innovation aid ‘treatment effect’ 
of 0.27 with a standard error of about .02 seems the most justifiable16.  The lowest 
effect (0.23, Table 4 equation iv) is achieved with the uncallipered approach but the 
maximum absolute value of [propensity score –propensity score (nearest neighbour)] 
was as high as 0.037. Hence the calliper results are preferred; dropping some 
observations seemed a worthwhile price to achieve a closer match.  
 
Because the state aid equation specification may affect the results, a version 
(‘restricted’) (not tabulated) excluding the collaboration arrangements of the SME was 
compared with a version including them (‘full’)(Appendix B). The fuller specification is a 
better predictor of support and reduces the absolute bias after matching relative to the 
restricted specification in the weighted callipered equations (compare estimated 
equations (ii) and (iii) Table 4) from 3.23 to 2.49 percent. Equations (v) and (vi), the 
unweighted versions of equations (ii) and (iii), might suggest a preference for the larger 
coefficient of 0.3, for eq (v) has the lower bias. But the aim of the present exercise is to 
establish a conservative or downward biased estimate of the policy impact so equation 
(iii) (or (vi)) is preferred. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the 5 percent (but not the one percent) level after matching between treated and control SMEs for one region and one 
SIC, and raises the estimate of the effect on innovation of support. For these reasons, and because the 
difference was not significant at the one percent level, the specification of Table 4 iii was preferred.  
16 This estimate, that receipt of UK state support for innovation raises the chances that a service or manufacturing SME 
will innovate by 27 percentage points, is not readily compared with other results, which generally refer to different 
groupings of firms, model specifications and/or policy instruments. For example, Griffith et al. (2006) find that UK 
national funding increases the chances of whether R&D is undertaken (by all firms) by 19 percentage points. 
Restricting themselves to SMEs (as in the present study but focussing on a different policy instrument) in England and 
Wales, Wren and Storey (2002) estimate a thirty to one ratio between the increase in turnover and the outlays on the 
state funded marketing initiative. For a sample of 3000 English SMEs Mole et al (2009) find significant employment 
expansion from intensive business support but not from other types. 
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As for the tax credit, the matching exercise suggests that there is no significant 
difference between tax credit effects (0.296) and non-tax credit innovation aid impact 
(0.298) using the unweighted estimates (Table 5). These are closer than the weighted 
estimates (which are 0.303 – equation iv- for the tax credit and 0.274 –equation iii - for 
other innovation aid) for which we do not have standard errors, but with the 
unweighted standard errors of 0.02 the difference between the effects of the two 
types of aid would not be significant. In the light of the greater cost of the tax credit 
support, as well as the supposed greater efficiency, this finding is striking; a 
significantly larger tax credit ‘treatment effect’ would be expected. 
 
 
Table 5: SME Tax Credit Compared with Other State Aid for Innovation-Matching 
 unweighted probit weighted probit 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Tax credit policy effect 0.296     
.8429-.5399 
=.303 
Standard error 0.03    
Nontax credit UK innovation 
policy  0.298 
.7164-.4424 
=.274  
Standard error  0.02   
Absolute % bias before matching 18.37 14.63 14.64 18.37 
Absolute % bias after matching 3.15 2.65 3.14 4.67 
State aided off support 18 56 59 18 
Total state aided 444 1144 1144 444 
Total sample 10066 10219 10219 10066 
Specification restricted restricted restricted restricted 
.001 caliper no replacement yes yes yes yes 
 
 
It is instructive to compare single equation estimates of the impact of innovation aid 
with the matching exercises. The weighted probit for SMEs yields a policy impact 
coefficient (0.27) comparable with those of the calliper equations, weighted and 
unweighted, with the same full specification, and a comparable standard error of 0.024 
(Equation (i) Table 6)17. Similarly, there is no significant difference in the coefficients on 
                                                 
17 In accordance with the strategy of downwardly biasing the estimate of returns, equation (i) Table 6 includes foreign sales because 
the variable slightly lowers the policy coefficient compared with the specification excluding exports. 
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the tax credit and the non-tax credit state aid in innovation equation (ii) Table 6, 
although the tax credit coefficient is smaller.  
 
Because all these estimates are obtained from cross-section rather than panel data, 
one interpretation of the similarity of the probit and propensity score measurement 
parameters is that both are upward biassed – on the grounds that the probits do not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity (discussed in section 3.2). In the following 
section the sensitivity of the policy conclusion to a halving of the parameter is 
therefore tested. Alternatively the similarity of the estimates could be interpreted as 
indicating the unimportance of such heterogeneity in this case. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
4.2 Innovation Impact 
The second key relationship to be estimated is how innovation affects the expansion of 
the innovating enterprise. In the growth equations for SMEs in Table 7, equation (i) 
provides a test of the endogeneity of innovation to the growth of the firm. The 
innovation residuals in the control function just reject endogeneity at the five percent 
level with a two tailed test. The innovation coefficient itself is large, at 0.19, and 
significantly greater than zero at the one percent level (equation (i)). But with a large 
standard error, it is not significantly different from the OLS coefficient of 0.073 at the 
95 percent level (equation (iii) Table 7). The IV estimate (equation (ii)) of the innovation 
coefficient is smaller than the control function estimate, at 0.1483, significant at the 
2.2 percent level18. But even more than the control function estimate, the wide 
standard errors leave considerable doubt as to the true value of the coefficient. It is 
however worth noting that a similar specification estimated on CIS4 large firm data 
does not reject the null that the innovation coefficient is zero, implying that pooling 
firms of all sizes for these innovation impact estimates could be misleading.  
                                                 
18
 The higher value of the IV estimate of the innovation coefficient is consistent with (unobserved) 
innovative SME managements being less prone to expand their firms than others. The first stage F statistic of 80 is not 
consistent with weak instruments, nor is the significance of Shea’s partial R
2
.  The Hanson J coefficient does not reject 
the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (uncorrelated with the disturbance term) and that the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.   
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If the innovation residual coefficient of (i) is judged statistically insignificant, IV 
estimation is inappropriate. Certainly this is the line to take when, as here, the 
objective is to establish a conservative or downward biased estimate of innovation 
policy impact. On these grounds the innovation coefficient of the OLS equation (iii) 
Table 7, 0.073, is the most reliable estimate available, with a 95 percent chance that 
the true value lies between 0.04 and 0.10619.  
Table 7 here 
The other coefficients are of less fundamental interest, other than as controls.  
Whether or not they are biased by unobserved heterogeneity is therefore not critical 
to estimating the impact of innovation policy. Nonetheless there appears to be a 
consistently large positive growth effect across estimation methods from being a new 
firm. Other substantial impacts are associated with membership of an enterprise group 
and employing graduates. Surprisingly perhaps, exporting appears to make no 
difference to growth of turnover.  
 
SMEs in mining and quarrying, the base case, were in a relatively fast growing sector, 
not different from financial intermediation and significantly greater than most 
manufacturing sectors. Only SMEs in electricity gas and water were likely to grow faster. 
The sole significant effect at the regional level was the slower growth of SMEs in the 
West Midlands. 
 
5.   Was Innovation Policy Efficient?  
The return to the state support for innovation by SMEs depends on the boost to well-
being from innovation. In section 3.3 and Appendix A it is contended that change in 
turnover or revenue (∆R) is the most appropriate available indicator of change in 
                                                 
19 Griffith et al. (2006) estimate 5.5 per cent higher labour productivity for firms with product innovation, less than 0.073 but the 
present estimate is for the effect on turnover not on labour productivity (for reasons explained at length in Appendix A). Moreover  
a sensitivity analysis is conducted in section 5 below. Here the coefficient is reduced by one standard error, from 0.073 to 0.058 
(similar to the Griffith et al figure) and the large returns are not substantially dented. Usng CIS3 Griffith et al consider only firms with 
more than 20 employees and cover the full size range above this level, in contrast to the present exercise. 
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wellbeing, as measured by consumers’ surplus and profits. This then is the return to 
policy. The counterfactual policy is no state support. So the number of firms (n) actually 
receiving aid may be denoted by the increase in state support (∆S) from the 
counterfactual position (where S is a binary variable as defined in section 3.2 above).  
 
The proportionate increase in turnover induced by innovation aid for the average firm is 
the proportion of SMEs aided (n/N) times the product of two parameters. They are, first 
from equation (1), the increase in the chances of the average firm innovating (∆ Pr(I)) as 
a consequence of  receiving state aid for this purpose (defined as  =∆ Pr(I)/∆S)). The 
second, from equation (3), is the average SME’s lift to turnover as a result of innovating 
(defined as k = ∆ R/(∆I.R)). The result of state supported innovation for the average SME 
is then; 
∆ R/R =.k.(n/N)                                          ...(4) 
where ∆R is the measure of induced SME profit (Π) and the consumers’ surplus (CS). 
Aggregating over the whole economy ∆R must be evaluated in terms of value added. 
Relevant GDP is N.v, where v is the average SME value added and N is the number of 
SMEs. Average SME value added is less than average turnover. The consumers’ surplus 
and profit measures are calculated as proportions of turnover (∆ R/R ≤ ((∆CS+∆Π)/R)) 
and so are multiplied by R/v to convert them to into GDP units.  This allows (4) to be 
expanded to yield the value of the welfare gain -  the product of the turnover boost to 
the average (non-micro) SME (∆R) and the number of SMEs (N). 
 
N.v.(R/v).(∆R/R) = .k.(n/N)(R/v).N.v = N. ∆R      ...(5) 
 
UK private sector GDP 2002 was £830 billion20. SMEs account for about one half of 
British private sector output, but micro firms are not sampled by CIS.  Micro firms 
produce approximately one half of the turnover of the SME sector (BERR 2008). 
Including their output contribution in the model would upward bias the calculation and 
                                                 
20 Government weight 0.225 removed from £1075 billion GDP for 2002 from Meader and Tily (2008). 
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excluding it would impart a downward bias. The latter option is preferred here. So SME 
innovation policy is assumed to be working on 27.5 percent of private sector output in 
2002 or (£830 billion*0.275=) £228 billion. This must equal the product of the average 
value added per SME (v) and the number of (non-micro) SMEs (N). The ratio R/v for the 
private sector SMEs was about 2.75 in 200221. The proportion of SMEs aided was 
(n/N=9.5 percent), the total innovation impact on output (in Table 7 estimated 
equation.(iii)) is k=0.0733,  and the innovation parameter for total innovation support 
(Table 4 equations (iii) or (vi)) is =0.27. 
 
Using equation (5), where ∆R is welfare improvement (= increase in consumers’ surplus 
plus profit), the return to state aid in terms of GDP is 
= (relevant GDP). (R/v).(∆ R/∆I. R).(∆ Pr(I)/∆S).(n/N) 
=228*2.75*0.0733*0.27*0.095 
 =£1180 million in each year in 2002 prices 
 
This must be compared with the approximately £ 320 million p.a. cost of SME innovation 
policy 2002-4 to obtain the return22. Then the downward biased benefit estimate 
implies more than a 250 percent return on the £320 million outlay. Reducing the state 
aid coefficient (α) by one standard error (0.02) lowers the return to £1090 million, 
making little difference. Cutting it in half, halves the money valued return, which is still 
an excellent 84 percent. Lowering the growth impact of innovation (k) by one standard 
error (0.015) cuts the benefit to £930 million, again not significantly denting the massive 
return. Combining this reduced k with a halving of α yields a return of 46 percent; there 
is plenty of scope for downward revisions of parameter estimates while leaving high 
policy returns. It should also be remembered that among other large downward biases 
to the welfare estimates are that benefits to micro firms are not considered, nor are 
                                                 
21 Calculated from BIS Table 1 2002 and 2007 Enterprise and Small Businesses. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/enterprise/enterprisesmes/index.html 
22  Abramovsky et al (2004)’s named support programme totals (using the earlier years, where there are two) amount to £156 million 
per annum. Multiply by 0.8 (because in January 2004, there were 899 Knowledge Transfer Partnerships, roughly 80% of which 
involved SMEs; about 2,400 firms, mostly SMEs, and about 200 research base institutions were involved in 75 LINK programmes 
since the launch of LINK in 1986,) to get an approximation to the SME allocation. Add in SME R&D tax credits of about £0.2 billion 
p.a. to reach approximately £ 320 million p.a. as the cost of SME innovation policy 2002-4. 
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spillovers, and that the output impact of an innovation may well continue after the 
three year period considered23. 
 
According to the SME equation much of the return to innovation could apparently be 
earned without the expensive tax credit24. Tax credits had a smaller take up than other 
innovation policies (4.2 percent of SMEs compared with 9.5 percent, Table 3).  Table 5, 
(propensity score matching) and Table 6 (the weighted innovation equation) suggest 
that the tax credit impact on innovation was unlikely to have been significantly stronger 
than other innovation policy instruments, despite the greater expense. Perhaps the 
spread of information about the tax credit in due course would raise innovation rates, 
but presumably at additional public cost.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Three basic equations have been proposed to link innovation support, innovation 
outcomes and SME growth. By focussing on self-reported innovation the approach 
ensures a wider coverage of innovative SMEs that respond to policy than included in 
most studies.  The large (around 10,000 observations) representative UK SME sample 
includes both services and manufacturing businesses, although micro firms are largely 
excluded. 
 
In view of the inevitable uncertainties in evaluating SME innovation policy, the method 
has been to aim for a downward biased or conservative estimate of impact. The study 
addresses the policy counterfactual of how an enterprise would have performed if it had 
not received innovation support, when actually it did, with propensity score matching. 
The matching exercises generated broadly similar estimates of the impact of UK state 
aid upon innovation, the first key parameter, to those from conventional single equation 
approaches.  
 
                                                 
23 The profits and consumers’ surplus performance measure are ratios with turnovers as denominators so the same turnover to 
value added ratio is needed to calculate the impact in these terms. 
24 Unless tax credits triggered innovations that were disproportionately productive. 
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To justify the use of the turnover SME performance variable, the paper discussed how 
policy benefits could best be defined and measured, a theme generally left implicit in 
the literature. UK SME performance and innovation equations show that self-reported 
innovation significantly predicts differences in enterprise turnover growth. Estimates of 
the second key parameter, the effect of innovations on growth, indicate strong and 
significant boosts to SME revenue.  There is no significant difference between the 
effects on SMEs of R&D tax credits and other state aid for innovation. Since the much 
smaller take up implies that the tax credit is an expensive instrument, the findings are 
consistent with Baghana and Mohnen’s (2009) assessment of considerable deadweight 
losses from such credits. 
 
Comparing the calculated payoffs with the outlays implies that the returns to British 
innovation policy 2002-4 were nonetheless very substantial. Because no attempt is 
made to calculate spillover benefits between enterprises, the gains for micro enterprises 
or the persistence of induced innovation effects beyond the three year window, the 
estimates of policy impact will be downward biased for these reasons. The bias 
reinforces the conclusion that SME innovation policy is efficient as well as effective. 
Also, the finding supplements the consensus view of high social returns to R&D by 
extending it to include other forms of innovation effort, as far as SMEs are concerned. A 
reason the estimated returns are so large is that, unlike the conventional productivity 
approach, the performance measure here does take into account demand shifting by 
innovation and measures welfare effects more appropriately. Also the greater coverage 
of firms without formal R&D recorded markedly expands the number of SMEs assessed 
as responding to state innovation aid. These very high returns found suggest that, even 
in times of public spending cuts, persisting with SME innovation policy would be 
prudent. 
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Table 6.       SME Innovation Probits (Weighted) 
 (i) SME (ii) SME 
 dF/dx 
robust 
S.E. dF/dx 
robust 
S.E. 
UK state aid 0.2679  0.0238    
    tax credit   0.1872 0.0516 
    other UK state aid   0.2291 0.0288 
graduates 0.1608  0.0139  0.1813 0.0133 
foreign sales 0.1366  0.0160    
investment/turnover 0.0106  0.0096  0.0117 0.0092 
R&D/turnover 0.4106  0.2120  0.3228 0.1538 
collaboration – other group 0.1051  0.0414  0.0872 0.0395 
   suppliers 0.2278  0.0395  0.2356 0.0395 
   customers 0.1735  0.0432  0.1557 0.0419 
   competitors -0.0657  0.0399  -0.0885 0.0366 
   university 0.0209  0.0430  0.0335 0.0415 
EU aid   0.1065 0.1030 
framework programme   -0.1884 0.0790 
start after 01/01/2000 0.0586  0.0207  0.0571 0.0202 
log turnover 0.0092  0.0051  0.0158 0.0050 
mfr of food, clothing, wood, 
paper 0.1759  0.0565  0.1948 0.0553 
mfr of fuels, chemicals, 
plastic 0.1691  0.0554  0.2093 0.0540 
mfr of electrical and optical 0.2613  0.0580  0.3038 0.0555 
mfr of transport equipments 0.1494  0.0671  0.1930 0.0651 
mfr not elsewhere classfied 0.2390  0.0598  0.2695 0.0581 
electricity, gas & water 
supply -0.1010  0.1044  -0.0980 0.1029 
construction -0.0523  0.0518  -0.0853 0.0478 
wholesale trade (incl cars & 
bikes) 0.1656  0.0582  0.1319 0.0564 
retail trade (excl cars & 
bikes) 0.0288  0.0562  0.0072 0.0535 
hotels & restaurants -0.0202  0.0581  -0.0262 0.0559 
transport, storage & 
communication 0.0804  0.0562  0.0943 0.0552 
financial intermediation 0.1484  0.0618  0.1487 0.0607 
real estate, renting & 
business 0.1712  0.0538  0.1736 0.0526 
observed probability 0.3588    0.3504   
predicted probability (at x-bar) 0.3605   0.3477  
number of observations    10338  10547  
Wald Chi2 1241.67  1187.7  
log pseudolikelihood   -5539.30                        -5690.09  
pseudo R2      0.1791   0.1671   
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Table 7  SME (Weighted) Growth of Turnover 2002-2004 
 (i) Control Function 
(ii) Instrumental Variable 
estimate (iii) OLS  
 coeff robust t coeff robust z coeff 
robust 
t 
Innovation 0.1908  3.040  0.1483  2.290  0.0733  4.380  
Gourieroux generalised residuals -0.0714  -1.910      
start after 01/01/2000 0.1717  6.620  0.1740  6.760  0.1741  6.570  
enterprise group member 0.1270  4.850  0.1255  4.780  0.1300  5.060  
graduate 0.1135  5.260  0.1209  5.580  0.1442  6.750  
foreign sales -0.0081  -0.420  -0.0005  -0.030  0.0210  1.090  
log turnover -0.1587  -8.350  -0.1584  -8.350  
-
0.1653  -8.370  
mfr of food, clothing, wood, paper -0.1345  -2.880  -0.1282  -2.710  
-
0.1212  -2.630  
mfr of fuels, chemicals, plastic -0.1513  -3.240  -0.1445  -3.060  
-
0.1388  -2.990  
mfr of electrical and optical -0.1957  -3.610  -0.1838  -3.360  
-
0.1708  -3.280  
mfr of transport equipments -0.0450  -0.880  -0.0390  -0.750  
-
0.0318  -0.620  
mfr not elsewhere classfied -0.1580  -3.050  -0.1488  -2.840  
-
0.1394  -2.750  
electricity, gas & water supply 0.4244  1.950  0.4203  1.920  0.4171  1.920  
construction -0.0628  -1.320  -0.0636  -1.330  
-
0.0681  -1.420  
wholesale trade (incl cars & bikes) -0.0262  -0.550  -0.0204  -0.420  0.0139  0.280  
retail trade (excl cars & bikes) -0.2070  -4.020  -0.2053  -3.950  
-
0.2090  -4.020  
hotels & restaurants -0.2509  -4.300  -0.2509  -4.280  
-
0.2585  -4.390  
transport, storage & communication -0.0845  -1.670  -0.0814  -1.590  
-
0.0778  -1.530  
financial intermediation -0.0121  -0.210  -0.0060  -0.100  0.0049  0.080  
real estate, renting & business -0.1927  -3.800  -0.1848  -3.600  
-
0.1784  -3.580  
N E England -0.0445  -1.160  -0.0445  -1.160  
-
0.0476  -1.250  
N W England -0.0143  -0.370  -0.0137  -0.350  
-
0.0201  -0.520  
Yorks &Humber -0.0121  -0.320  -0.0105  -0.280  0.0075  0.170  
E Midlands -0.0170  -0.450  -0.0198  -0.520  
-
0.0192  -0.510  
W Midlands -0.0899  -2.420  -0.0900  -2.430  
-
0.0969  -2.610  
E England -0.0610  -1.660  -0.0623  -1.690  
-
0.0680  -1.850  
S E England -0.0203  -0.570  -0.0216  -0.600  
-
0.0315  -0.880  
S W England -0.0749  -1.770  -0.0759  -1.790  
-
0.0813  -1.930  
Wales 0.0229  0.560  0.0251  0.610  0.0193  0.480  
Scotland -0.0020  -0.050  0.0009  0.020  
-
0.0030  -0.080  
N Ireland -0.0114  -0.320  -0.0115  -0.320  
-
0.0173  -0.480  
constant 1.2867  8.160  1.2886  8.170  1.3444  8.280  
number of observations 10296  10296  10429  
R2 0.1461  0.1427  0.1471  
 
Note: eq (ii) the instrumented variable is  innovation.. Excluded instruments: uk innovation aid, collaboration 
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variables, R&D and investment. Partial R-squared  of  excluded instruments:   0.0885, Test of excluded 
instruments:   F(  8, 10258) =    89.70,   Prob > F      =   0.0000,  
First stage F( 37, 10258) =    80.79 
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic (identification/IV relevance test): 953.984,   Chi-sq(8) P-val =    0.0000; Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification  test of all instruments):    5.428,       Chi-sq(7) P-val =    0.6079; Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of  
endogenous regressors B1 in main equation, Ho:B1=0,   F(8,10258)=    3.22 ,   P-val=0.0012,  NB: Anderson-Rubin stat 
heteroskedasticity-robust,  
For large firms only: Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation, Ho:B1=0,   F(8,2371)=     
0.59      P-val=0.7848  
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Appendix A.  The value of innovation 
This appendix examines the relationship between the immediate consequences for profits, 
consumers’ surplus and turnover or revenue of two types of innovation by a firm with constant 
marginal costs facing a constant elasticity of demand function.  The purpose is first to show that 
with this plausible model some conventional measures of innovation impact substantially 
underestimate the welfare gains. The second purpose is to demonstrate that the proportionate 
increase in turnover is generally a good (close or downward biased) proxy for welfare 
(consumers’ surplus plus profits) increase. This allows the return to innovation policy spending 
to be calculated in section 5 above.  
 
Product Innovation 
To fix concepts first a diagrammatic presentation with linear demand is given. Product 
innovation shifts the demand function faced by the firm from Demand 1 to Demand 2 with 
marginal revenues MR1 and MR2 and constant marginal costs MC. In figure A1 willingness to pay 
increases as a result of the new product from XAQ1O  to ZCQ2O. Additional resources of Q1Q2DB 
are utilised (‘displaced’) by the enterprise25. So the net social benefit from the innovation is the 
change in consumers’ surplus  ZCP2 –XAP1 plus the change in the firm’s profit P2CDMC – P1ABMC. 
The change in the firm’s revenue or turnover is the sum of the profit increase and the cost rise 
or displacement. In the long run, when there are no effective entry barriers, this profit may be 
eliminated as competition shifts back the demand curve.  
 
In figure A1, strictly Q1 is a different entity from Q2, transformed by the product innovation.  The 
market would have been willing to pay at the margin more for the new product at volume Q1 
than for the old product. This greater willingness to pay is represented by the upward shift in 
the demand curve at Q1.  However in models without an explicit demand function, this will not 
be identified.  What will be observed are equilibria P1, Q1 and P2, Q2 and these, after due 
allowance for the extra resources absorbed, will provide the estimated productivity impact of 
the innovation.  Inspection of figure A1 as drawn suggests some productivity increase, more 
revenue in relation to costs, would be estimated. But in the constant elasticity case considered 
                                                 
25
 Displacement measures the extent to which the benefits of a project are offset by reductions of output or 
employment elsewhere (H M Treasury 2003 p.53). 
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below there is no equilibrium price increase and therefore measured productivity (the ratio of 
revenue to costs) does not change at all, even though welfare has risen substantially.  Hence 
productivity and production function estimates of innovation without enterprise demand 
functions are likely markedly to under-estimate returns to innovation.  
 
Figure A1. Product Innovation for a firm with market power   
 
Assuming for the innovating firm a constant elasticity demand function, where P is price and Q 
output volume,  Q=aPb  . From which turnover or revenue is, R=PQ= Q(1/b)+1 a-1/b 
And marginal revenue MR  = ∂R/∂Q= a-1/b((1/b)+1)Q1/b 
The profit maximisation first order condition is  
MR=((1/b)+1)(Q/a)1/b =MC =((1/b)+1)P 
MR2/MR1=MC2/MC1=(a1Q2/a2Q1)
1/b =1  
In this case with no change in marginal costs the proportionate shift in MR or the demand 
function  is the same as the proportionate increase in Q; 
a2/a1 = Q2/ Q1 
where the shift in MR is given by the change in a, a2>a1. 
And P2/P1 = MC2 /MC1 
With no change in marginal cost by assumption, price is unaltered. 
The proportionate revenue change is therefore the same as the volume change. 
Similarly for profits: 
X 
Z 
Price 
Output 
P2 
P1 
MC MC 
Demand2 
MR2 
Demand1 
MR1 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Q1 Q2 O 
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Π = P.Q-Q.MC= Q(P-MC) = - (1/b)Q.P 
Π2/ Π1 = Q2 /Q1 
Π1/R1  =  -(1/b)Q1.P1 / P1Q1  =- 1/b 
The profit to turnover ratio falls as the elasticity  b increases. 
With price held constant at P1 say, the difference in consumers’ surplus (CS) is 
 
Consumers’ surplus increase in relation to revenue is; 
 
The total welfare increase includes profits as well as consumers’ surplus, and this tends to raise 
the welfare increase above the turnover or revenue expansion proxy but by less as the elasticity 
rises (in absolute value). When b=-2.5, an increase in turnover of 10 percent is associated with 
an rise in the ratio of consumers’ surplus to revenue of 16.66 percent26. Adding the increase in 
profits; 
Π/R1 = -1/b [(R2/R1) – 1] 
amounting to 4 percent, the welfare change reaches 20.6 percent. For all plausible elasticities, 
turnover increase from product innovation understates the rise in welfare. 
 
Process Innovation 
In Figure A2 a process innovation shifts the cost function from MC1 to MC2. Turnover increases 
from P1EQ1O to P2FQ2O. The increase in consumers’ surplus is P1EFP2 and in profits P2FDMC2 - 
P1EBMC1.  ‘Displacement’ could be negative, resource use could be lower, if MC1BCMC2>CDQ2 
Q1. 
Assuming a constant elasticity demand function  Q=aPb  ,  R=PQ= Q(1/b)+1 a-1/b 
and MR  = ∂R/∂Q= a-1/b((1/b)+1)Q1/b.  
The profit maximisation first order condition is MR2/MR1=MC2/MC1=(Q2/Q1)
1/b. 
A process innovation that lowers average and marginal costs by MC2/MC1 will increase profit 
maximising output by ( MC2/MC1)
 b and (as can be seen by substituting into the demand 
function) reduce profit maximising prices by the same fall in the marginal cost ratio.  
                                                 
26
 Tellis (1988) in a meta-analysis of several hundred price elasticity studies  found a   mean price elasticity 
of -1.76 which he raised to about  -2.5 to take into account method-induced biases. 
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Figure A2. Process Innovation for a Firm with Market Power  
 
Since P = (Q/a)1/b 
 P2/P1=MC2/MC1 
So R2/R1=P2Q2/P1Q1 = (MC2/MC1) 
1+b 
With an elasticity of b=-2.5 turnover increases by more than the marginal costs fall, but with an 
elasticity of b=-1.5, turnover increases by less.  
The profit (Π) identity is  
Π = P.Q-Q.MC= Q(P-MC) 
And 
MR=((1/b)+1)(Q/a)1/b =MC =((1/b)+1)P 
So Π = - (1/b)Q.P 
Π2/ Π1 =  R2/R1
 
And  Π 1/R1 
= -1/b 
Profit increases proportionately with turnover. 
The change in consumers’ surplus (CS) as a proportion of initial revenue (R1) consequent upon 
the innovation-induced price fall from P1 to P2 is 
   = ∆CS/R1=(1/(b+1))(1-  (P2/ P1)
b+1 ) 
A 
Price 
Output 
P2 
P1 
Demand 
MR 
E 
B 
F 
D 
Q1 Q2 O 
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The proportionate fall in marginal costs from the process innovation  is the same as the 
proportionate decline in price.  When b=-2.5 a 10 percent fall in prices and marginal costs raises 
the ratio of consumers surplus to revenue by 11.3 percent.  (P2/ P1)
b+1  can be written in terms of 
revenue by substituting in the demand function, as (Q2P2)/Q1P1 = R2/R1.  
So the relationship of this revenue or turnover to the consumers’ surplus measure is 
∆CS/R1 =1/(b+1)[1- ( R2/R1)].  
Revenue change overstates the gain in CS/R from process innovation  by  50 percent with an 
elasticity of -2.5 but total welfare change includes the additional profit as well;  
Π/R1 = [(R2/R1) – 1]( Π/R1) = -(1/b)[(R2/R1) – 1] 
When b=-2.5 a 15 percent increase in revenue from a process innovation ( representing a 10 
percent increase in CS/R)  is associated  with a 6 percent rise in the profit to pre-innovation 
revenue.  Adding the two welfare components and using Tellis’s (1988) estimate of mean price 
elasticity then shows turnover increase from this type of innovation  as well is  less than the 
total welfare increase.  
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 Appendix B.  State Aid Equations 
 
Probability of SMEs Receiving Innovation Aid (Probit) 
 weighted unweighted 
 dF/dx 
robust 
z dF/dx 
robust 
z 
foreign sales 0.0637 8.24 0.0574 8.52 
log employment 0.0115 2.31 0.0139 3.34 
log turnover -0.0094 -2.61 -0.0132 -4.31 
R&D/turnover 0.0624 2.67 0.0422 2.04 
investment/turnover -0.0218 -1.31 -0.0099 -0.85 
Graduates 0.0388 5.34 0.054 8.43 
start after 01/01/2000 0.0135 1.36 0.0117 1.35 
collaboration – other group -0.0138 -1.03 -0.0193 -1.58 
                             Suppliers 0.0315 1.81 0.0338 2.17 
                            Customers 0.0427 2.43 0.0555 3.36 
                            Competitors -0.0072 -0.51 -0.0013 -0.1 
                            University 0.16 7.37 0.1613 8.79 
N W England -0.0324 -2.96 -0.0347 -3 
Yorks &Humber -0.0169 -1.32 -0.0359 -3.04 
E Midlands -0.0411 -3.97 -0.0516 -4.64 
W Midlands -0.0338 -3.04 -0.0431 -3.87 
E England -0.0479 -4.84 -0.052 -4.8 
London -0.0536 -4.81 -0.0663 -6.2 
S E England -0.04 -3.72 -0.0497 -4.58 
S W England -0.0338 -3.04 -0.0491 -4.35 
Wales 0.0375 2.59 0.044 2.93 
Scotland 0.0001 0 -0.0073 -0.56 
N Ireland 0.0019 0.15 0.0062 0.49 
mfr of food, clothing, wood, paper 0.0192 0.74 0.0306 1.07 
mfr of fuels, chemicals, plastic 0.0415 1.52 0.0566 1.9 
mfr of electrical and optical 0.0602 1.89 0.0725 2.15 
mfr of transport equipments 0.0122 0.43 0.0237 0.74 
mfr not elsewhere classfied 0.0326 1.09 0.044 1.36 
electricity, gas & water supply -0.0496 -1.15 -0.0499 -0.85 
Construction -0.0017 -0.07 -0.0094 -0.36 
wholesale trade (incl cars & bikes) -0.0164 -0.67 -0.0264 -1.07 
retail trade (excl cars & bikes) -0.0131 -0.55 -0.0304 -1.26 
hotels & restaurants -0.0226 -0.89 -0.023 -0.87 
transport, storage & communication 0.0059 0.23 0.0066 0.24 
financial intermediation -0.0419 -1.88 -0.0523 -2.23 
real estate, renting & business 0.0347 1.37 0.0342 1.25 
number of observations 10093   10093   
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Wald Chi2(36)  627.16  906.37  
log pseudolikelihood            -2632.84  -2998.93  
pseudo R2    0.1670   0.1584   
observed probability 0.0946   0.1131   
predicted probability (at x-bar) 0.0690    0.0836    
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Appendix C.  
Matching of aid recipients and non – recipients by characteristics 
Weighted probit, calliper.001, no replacement - eq.(iii) Table 4. 
 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
------------ ----------- -------- -------- --------- --------- --------- ------- 
Foreign Sales Unmatched 0.5683 0.30544 54.9  18 0 
 Matched 0.52705 0.57315 -9.6 82.5 -2.07 0.039 
        
Graduate Unmatched 0.80298 0.571 51.7  15.22 0 
 Matched 0.77756 0.76152 3.6 93.1 0.85 0.395 
        
Emp1oyment Unmatched 3.6101 3.3999 21.4  6.81 0 
 Matched 3.5948 3.5773 1.8 91.7 0.4 0.687 
        
Turnover Unmatched 7.6384 7.557 5.8  1.81 0.071 
 Matched 7.6579 7.6992 -2.9 49.2 -0.67 0.501 
        
R&D/Turnover Unmatched 0.26035 0.011 11  7.25 0 
 Matched 0.04916 0.02985 0.8 92.3 1.26 0.208 
        
Investment/Turnover Unmatched 0.07151 0.04407 3.9  1.17 0.24 
 Matched 0.05093 0.02482 3.7 4.8 2.38 0.018 
        
Start after 1 1 2000 Unmatched 0.1366 0.12513 3.4  1.1 0.272 
 Matched 0.12625 0.12525 0.3 91.3 0.07 0.946 
        
Enterprise group  
collaboration Unmatched 0.16112 0.05821 33.4  12.95 0 
 Matched 0.13527 0.13427 0.3 99 0.07 0.948 
        
Supplier 
collaboration Unmatched 0.26357 0.0877 47.5  18.36 0 
 Matched 0.20541 0.21543 -2.7 94.3 -0.55 0.583 
        
Customer 
collaboration Unmatched 0.26795 0.08144 50.7  19.95 0 
 Matched 0.20441 0.20741 -0.8 98.4 -0.17 0.868 
        
Competitor 
 collaboration Unmatched 0.15061 0.04904 34.4  13.68 0 
 Matched 0.12325 0.12725 -1.4 96.1 -0.27 0.787 
        
University 
collaboration Unmatched 0.1979 0.03016 54.7  25.47 0 
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 Matched 0.10321 0.11222 -2.9 94.6 -0.65 0.516 
        
Region dum_2 Unmatched 0.08581 0.08893 -1.1  -0.35 0.727 
 Matched 0.08216 0.08317 -0.4 67.8 -0.08 0.935 
        
            dum_3 Unmatched 0.07443 0.08156 -2.7  -0.83 0.405 
 Matched 0.07415 0.08918 -5.6 -111 -1.23 0.22 
        
            dum_4 Unmatched 0.05954 0.08625 -10.3  -3.08 0.002 
 Matched 0.06513 0.07014 -1.9 81.2 -0.45 0.656 
        
            dum_5 Unmatched 0.07793 0.08781 -3.6  -1.12 0.264 
 Matched 0.08016 0.08016 0 100 0 1 
        
            dum_6 Unmatched 0.0648 0.08926 -9.2  -2.77 0.006 
 Matched 0.06814 0.05511 4.9 46.8 1.21 0.226 
        
            dum_7 Unmatched 0.03853 0.08245 -18.5  -5.23 0 
 Matched 0.03808 0.0521 -5.9 68.1 -1.51 0.131 
        
            dum_8 Unmatched 0.07093 0.09921 -10.1  -3.06 0.002 
 Matched 0.06914 0.07214 -1.1 89.4 -0.26 0.793 
        
            dum_9 Unmatched 0.06217 0.08602 -9.1  -2.75 0.006 
 Matched 0.06313 0.06613 -1.1 87.4 -0.27 0.785 
        
            dum_10 Unmatched 0.13485 0.06446 23.7  8.67 0 
 Matched 0.13427 0.10721 9.1 61.6 1.86 0.064 
        
            dum_11 Unmatched 0.09895 0.07541 8.3  2.79 0.005 
 Matched 0.0982 0.0982 0 100 0 1 
        
            dum_12 Unmatched 0.14186 0.09686 13.9  4.74 0 
 Matched 0.14028 0.13727 0.9 93.3 0.19 0.846 
        
Sic dum_2 Unmatched 0.10158 0.09116 3.5  1.14 0.252 
 Matched 0.10621 0.10922 -1 71.1 -0.22 0.829 
        
Sic dum_3 Unmatched 0.20578 0.12311 22.4  7.78 0 
 Matched 0.20842 0.19739 3 86.7 0.61 0.541 
        
Sic dum_4 Unmatched 0.08932 0.03821 21  7.96 0 
 Matched 0.08417 0.08517 -0.4 98 -0.08 0.936 
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Sic dum_5 Unmatched 0.03065 0.02257 5  1.7 0.089 
 Matched 0.03006 0.02906 0.6 87.6 0.13 0.895 
        
Sic dum_6 Unmatched 0.04991 0.03642 6.6  2.25 0.025 
 Matched 0.0511 0.04609 2.5 62.9 0.52 0.603 
        
Sic dum_7 Unmatched 0.00088 0.0029 -4.7  -1.25 0.211 
 Matched 0.001 0.002 -2.3 50.6 -0.58 0.564 
        
Sic dum_8 Unmatched 0.05166 0.10747 -20.7  -5.9 0 
 Matched 0.05711 0.07114 -5.2 74.9 -1.28 0.201 
        
Sic dum_9 Unmatched 0.0324 0.07016 -17.2  -4.85 0 
 Matched 0.03607 0.03808 -0.9 94.7 -0.24 0.813 
        
Sic dum_10 Unmatched 0.0359 0.09563 -24.3  -6.69 0 
 Matched 0.04108 0.03808 1.2 95 0.34 0.731 
        
Sic dum_11 Unmatched 0.02627 0.05161 -13.1  -3.75 0 
 Matched 0.03006 0.02405 3.1 76.3 0.83 0.408 
        
Sic dum_12 Unmatched 0.05779 0.08792 -11.6  -3.45 0.001 
 Matched 0.06513 0.06613 -0.4 96.7 -0.09 0.928 
        
Sic dum_13 Unmatched 0.01226 0.04268 -18.7  -4.99 0 
 Matched 0.01403 0.01202 1.2 93.4 0.39 0.693 
        
Sic dum_14 Unmatched 0.29422 0.21506 18.2  6.05 0 
 Matched 0.26253 0.26954 -1.6 91.1 -0.35 0.723 
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"This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and 
reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen's 
Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does 
not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or 
analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which 
may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates." 
